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1 Introduction
This study examines accounting information on financial instruments presented in accordance
with IFRS 7 and IAS 39. As accounting for financial instruments under IFRS leaves man-
agement with a substantial degree of discretion in the choice of a reporting format and most
managers choose to report the instruments by measurement categories, we seek to identify bi-
ases in investors’ risk perception that are caused by this discretion. In this context bias means
that a specific economic underlying such as a cash flow is perceived to be of different risks if
presented in different ways. On the one hand, our study is motivated by analytical research
on financial statement presentation, which models the effect of the presentation format on risk
perception as if investors were either not fully rational (Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003)) or only
asymmetrically informed (Dye & Sridhar (2004)), as well as by archival research measuring
differences in the effects of informationally equivalent forms of disclosure (e.g., Riedl & Srini-
vasan (2007) and Aboody (1996), see Koonce & Mercer (2005) for an overview). On the other
hand, our study is motivated by behavioural research on the effects of accounting information
on investors’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Elliott (2006), Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005),
and Hopkins (1996), see Kachelmeier & King (2002) for an overview). Our study shares the
use of the experimental method with this latter stream of literature.
A common characteristic of previous literature that dealt with presentation of financial in-
struments is that it analyses reporting formats that are either not allowed or not applied under
IFRS. Weber, Siebenmorgen, & Weber (2005) find that presentation of financial investments by
asset names causes familiarity effects, which bias investors’ expected risk assessment. Koonce,
McAnally, & Mercer (2005) analyse the risk perception of different financial items presented
by product types. Their findings suggest that product-specific labels affect risk perception and
that the presentation of a specific cash flow as a financial derivative increases the risk investors
associate with that cash flow. Product-specific presentation is, however, a reporting format that
is not widely applied in Europe. A majority of European banks (51%) rather uses the mea-
surement categories provided by IAS 39 as line items on the balance sheet. In extension of
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Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer (2005), our study therefore tests the effect of actual reporting
practice on risk perception so that we are able to apply those prior findings to a setting which
is close to European accounting practice. We construct a theoretical framework that explains
how measurement bases affect risk perception in a way similar to product labels. Our study is
also related to Hirst, Hopkins, & Wahlen (2004) since it also analyses the effect of the presen-
tation of the fair value category on risk judgment. Unlike Hirst, Hopkins, & Wahlen (2004),
however, our study refers to the effects of fair value measurement via the presentation format
of the financial statement instead of its effects via the income statement.
The first main result of this study is that investors infer a different level of risk from financial
reports of economically identical investments in financial instruments if different measurement
categories are applied and presented. In particular, a company’s use of the fair value option (FV)
or of the loans & receivables (L&R) category is perceived to be of the highest risk. The presen-
tation of a financial derivative in the held-for-trading (HFT) category also increases perceived
risk. This latter effect, however, is partly offset by the off-balance-sheet approach in accounting
for certain derivatives and more specifically by the corresponding improvement in the debt-to-
equity ratio. When investors receive footnotes along with the balance sheets and learn about the
actual financial instruments contained in the reported category, they significantly change their
risk assessment. A regression analysis reveals that the direction and the extent of this change
are associated with behavioural variables describing the familiarity with investment decisions
or the ease with which negative or positive outcomes of particular investments are recalled.
Behavioural explanations for individual risk assessment of measurement categories are the
second main result of the study. We find that cognitive availability of information about the
recent subprime crisis increases the perceived risk through the use of the L&R category and
that availability of information about catastrophic derivative losses increases the perceived risk
through the use of the trading category, even though in both cases no investor has any infor-
mation on the financial product actually accounted for in the respective category. This result
suggests that investors, in the absence of footnotes, intuitively infer the type of financial prod-
ucts contained in the reported measurement categories and that they base their risk assessment
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on this inference. The availability effect identified in previous literature on product-specific
risk assessment therefore also indirectly explains biases in the risk perception of those two
measurement categories. Risk assessment of the fair value option is, however, not affected by
the availability of product-specific information. This finding suggests that natural cognitive
availability of negative information on fair value measurement directly causes a bias in the risk
perception of the use of the fair value option.
We contribute to the literature about behavioural aspects of accounting in several ways.
Firstly, we are able to construct a framework based on behavioural theory that explains how
the presentation of measurement categories can result in a biased risk perception in a way that
is similar to the presentation of product-specific information. Secondly, we find potentially
negative effects of actual European accounting practice on risk perception in an experimental
setting. More specifically, our findings suggest on the one hand a general upward bias in in-
vestors’ risk perception of assets measured at fair value. On the other hand they suggest an
upward bias in risk judgment of the L&R category if information on the recent subprime crisis
is cognitively available.
The results are of academic as well as practical importance. In the case of IAS 39 and IFRS 7,
there is an ongoing and controversial debate on the standard (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, &
Riedl (2007) and Spooner (2007)). Accounting for financial instruments is one of the IASB’s
core projects that will result in at least one more major revision of the accounting principles (In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (2008) and International Accounting Standards Board
(2006)). Experimental findings on the effect of the disclosure format as prescribed by the extant
standard on investor’s risk perception are therefore of the utmost importance to the improve-
ment of the standard. Since the standard allows the use of accounting procedures that result in
ambiguous or misleading information, it is not apt to achieve the theoretical objective of finan-
cial reporting because reporting such information is at least contradictory to the IASB’s main
objectives of comparability and decision-usefulness (IFRS F.12). Generally speaking, the iden-
tification of such shortcomings is the first step in improving the information content of financial
reports. Furthermore it is a call for standard-setting activity to prohibit the European practice
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of presenting financial instruments by measurement categories. Besides, both inherently am-
biguous and deliberately managed information might induce wrong investment or divestment
decisions by individuals and thereby affect market prices wrongfully. Our research therefore
also contributes to the understanding of the individual reception of accounting information.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four more sections. In Section 2 we develop
our theoretical approach with respect to extant literature on behavioural research in accounting
and derive hypotheses from it concerning the effect that measurement categories of financial
instruments have on the risk perceived by investors and concerning the factors that drive these
risk judgments. Section 3 presents the design of our study and the procedures we applied and
in section 4, we present and discuss our results. Conclusions and implications of our study are
laid out in section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development
Choices in the Disclosure of Financial Instruments under IFRS
Virtually all balance sheet items of any bank’s financial statement set up in accordance with
IFRS are affected by the accounting principles underlying IAS 39 and so is a substantial propor-
tion of any industrial company’s line items. Thus hardly any other single accounting standard
has a comparable impact on the way a financial statement is presented to investors. It is widely
accepted that IAS 39 provides management with a substantial variety of accounting and report-
ing choices (Gebhardt, Reichardt, & Wittenbrink (2004); Walton (2004)). One of these is the
choice of the classification that is used to present financial instruments on the face of the balance
sheet.
In the case of financial institutions such as banks, three general possibilities for presenting
financial instruments in a financial statement can be identified. The first possibility, though not
widely applied in IFRS financial statements of European banks (Figure 1), is a presentation
by investment purpose that distinguishes, e.g., between a hedging and a trading instrument or
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between a long-term and a short-term investment. The second possibility is a presentation by
type that distinguishes, for example, between stocks, bonds, and derivatives. This presentation
format was advocated by the Joint Working Group of Standard Setters which aimed particularly
at a distinction between derivative and non-derivative instruments. It later recommended the
application of this format in the draft standard on accounting for financial instruments (Joint
Working Group of Standard Setters, 1997, BC 5.1-5.5). The detail of information about deriva-
tives usage provided by banks indeed seems to have improved in the 1990s – at least in the
US (Edwards & Eller (1996, 1995)). There is some convincing evidence that a distinction of
financial instruments exclusively by their type will result in a biased risk perception by investors
(Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2006, 2005); Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer (2005)). This may be
one reason why less than one-fourth of European banks apply this format in their IFRS financial
statements (Figure 1) and why disclosure of derivatives usage by banks is still considered to be
incomplete (Woods & Marginson (2004)).
Figure 1:
Presentation formats used in financial statements of European banks
Source: Own data (sample of 109 banks from 28 European countries, 2006)
Measurement
51.38%
Product
15.6%
Purpose
11.93%
Other 21.1%
The third possible format, used by a majority of European banks, is a presentation by mea-
surement category. IFRS 7 allows a bank to use those measurement categories as line items on
the financial statement so that the choice of an instrument’s measurement base does not only
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affect the company’s income but also presentation and disclosure. As the choice of a measure-
ment base for non-derivative financial instruments is also left to the management’s discretion
even virtually identical companies, holding financial instruments of identical economic char-
acteristics, could present financial statements that differ both in the measurement and in the
labels of the individual line items. In the financial industry, economic identity can be estab-
lished by exploiting the replicability characteristic of non-contingent financial derivatives such
as interest-rate swaps or forwards. A company engaged in a derivative financial contract is
obliged to categorise this contract as a trading instrument and to measure it at fair value through
profit or loss even if it was actually acquired for hedging purposes (IAS 39.9). In order to
circumvent this obligation, a company might enter into non-derivative lending and borrowing
contracts that exactly replicate the future cash flows of the non-contingent derivative.1 If a com-
pany opts for the use of non-derivative contracts, there is an accounting choice between three
different measurement categories. A company can apply the fair value option, it can use the
available for sale category (AFS) or it can classify the instruments as loans and receivables.
If the presentation by measurement categories in accordance with IFRS 7 is applied, this set-
ting results in two major differences between the financial statements of economically identical
companies. The first difference is the label of the balance sheet item presenting the financial
contract. The second difference results from the accounting principle that the notional amount
of the derivative is not recognised on the balance sheet since the company has to make only
a relatively low (net) upfront payment whereas the lending and borrowing contracts are fully
recognised on the balance sheet. This accounting principle is also known as the off-balance-
sheet approach in accounting for financial derivatives. A real-world analogon to this setting is
the asset & liability management of a commercial bank that is exposed to the risk of chang-
ing interest rates on the money market. The economic and accounting choices of such a bank,
which we later exploit for our experimental manipulations, are summarised in Figure 2.
Biases in the Risk Perception of Financial Instruments Based on the Balance Sheet
1 In fact, the economic risk is not exactly identical for the two different positions as the counterparty risk is
somewhat lower for a non-contingent derivative than for a lending contract, see Hull (2006); Minton (1997).
We do however neglect this finding in the due course of our analysis.
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Figure 2:
Economic and accounting choices in the A&L management of a commercial bank
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The disclosure choices identified above would not cause any harm if investors were able to
recognise the economic identity of different companies. We do, however, seriously doubt such
an assumption and we attempt to falsify it in our experimental analysis. Prior research shows
that variation in presentation format and description of financial contracts affect investors’ risk
judgments by accentuating certain economic characteristics of the reported items. Therefore
financial reporting principles have the potential to result in a biased risk perception of investors
if they do not assure that economically like situations are reported alike (Gramlich, Mayew, &
McAnally (2006); Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005); Hodder, Koonce, & McAnally (2001);
Kennedy, Mitchell, & Sefcik (1998); Hopkins (1996)). Our analysis refers to a framework of
risk perception which is based on behavioural theory and that explains a bias that is caused by
the disclosure of measurement categories under IAS 39. Thereby, a bias is defined as a differ-
ence in the perceived risk of economically alike companies which only differ in the accounting
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and disclosure procedures applied.
In our framework, we expect investors to use two heuristics when judging the risk of a com-
pany that presents financial instruments by measurement categories. The two heuristics are
representativeness and availability. Both heuristics are necessary for explaining risk assess-
ment and potential biases. We expect representativeness to be used when investors translate
measurement categories into types of financial instruments and availability to be used when
investors judge the risk of these financial instruments. In prior research, availability is found to
be employed when an individual evaluates the probability of a certain event by the instances of
this event or by outcomes associated with this event that come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman
(1973)). Observation of the application of this heuristic is complicated by the fact that individ-
uals tend to rely on their subjective recall experience only they are sufficiently assertive of their
knowledge, i.e. when these instances and associations are recalled easily (Schwarz & Vaughn
(2002)). Ease of recall is also more likely to be used as a heuristic if the judgment task is of
relatively low personal relevance to an individual (Grayson & Schwarz (1999)).
Our reference to the availability heuristic is motivated by prior accounting research suggest-
ing that the perceived risk of financial instruments does not necessarily correspond to their
economic risk alone but also to the labels attached to them. Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005)
for example show that a portfolio of financial instruments containing a swap is perceived to
be riskier than a portfolio without a swap which generates exactly the same cash flows if it is
explicitly stated that the first portfolio does contain a swap and that the latter does not. This
effect is mitigated when cash flow and fair value exposures are made available. If, however, the
swap in the first portfolio is described as being used as a hedge, the perceived risk significantly
decreases as compared to an identical swap portfolio without this additional label. This effect
is not mitigated after revealing economic exposure. Labels of financial instruments therefore
affect perceived risk significantly by making different associations cognitively available.2 The
rather general association of derivatives usage with high risk is said to be due to investors’
2 Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005) argue that the label “hedge” emphasises the qualification of swaps as a
means of insurance against risk.
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cognitive availability of substantial losses in derivative transactions as a result of broad and
negative media coverage (Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005)) and it finds further support in
Chalmers & Godfrey (2004), Bodnar & Gebhardt (1999), and Vietze (1997). Still today the
use of derivatives in speculative trading strategies is a regular topic of investment magazines.
A recent example are the loss announcements by Fannie Mae, a US mortgage bank, that were
broadly covered in the news. With respect to the balance sheet classification of hybrid finan-
cial instruments, Hopkins (1996) obtains the similar result that a labelling effect exists in the
individual perception of financial information.3
Besides a replication of those results within the institutional setting of IAS 39, our contribu-
tion to this stream of accounting literature is an analysis of the effect of the recent international
subprime crisis on the risk associated with consumer loans. Mortgage loans to private con-
sumers are widely regarded as having triggered the international bank crisis in 2007 (Greenlaw,
Hatzius, Kashyap, & Shin (2008) and Ryan (2008)). We argue that the extensive negative me-
dia coverage on the banks investing in this kind of contracts will result in the same effect which
the negative media coverage of miscarried investments in derivatives had on the risk associated
with financial derivatives. Cosequently we expect investors to associate a higher risk with in-
vestments labelled as consumer loans or derivatives than with other investments because both
derivatives and consumer loans, due to extensive media coverage, are likely to be associated
with negative outcomes (Figure 3). Whether individuals thereby rely on ease of recall or on
content of recall, as it is distinguished in psychological theory (Schwarz & Vaughn (2002)),
will not affect their judgments in this case since both the ease of recall and the content of recall
are more likely to make the negative investment outcomes available than the positive ones.
The link to the actual disclosure scheme under IFRS, however, is still missing. That link is
established by the heuristic of representativeness. This heuristic was first identified by Tversky
& Kahneman (1974) and later applied by numerous studies in the field of behavioural finance to
model the behaviour of individual investors (see, e. g., Brav & Heaton (2002), Shleifer (2000),
3 Albeit without reference to behavioural explanations, Gramlich, Mayew, & McAnally (2006) show that balance
sheet classification, in their natural setting the choice between “short-term” and “long-term” debt, is used by
market participants to infer underlying economic characteristics of the reporting firms.
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Figure 3:
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Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998)). The concept refers to the observation of investors basing
their judgment of new information on its representativeness for certain events. If the given in-
formation is highly representative for an event, investors might overestimate the probability that
this event occurred and, accordingly, underestimate the probability of other events which could
produce the same information (Kahneman & Frederick (2002)). Applied to our setting, the con-
cept predicts that, if a measurement category is regarded to be representative for an investment
in a certain type of financial instruments, investors infer information about the company’s risk
exposure from the balance sheet disclosure of this category. Representativeness allows them do
so even though they do not associate the category itself with a specific degree of risk.
In particular, we expect the HFT category to be representative for an investment in financial
derivatives and the L&R category to be representative for an investment in consumer loans. An
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investor, for example, upon learning that some company reports trading assets (HFT) assigns a
high probability to this company using financial derivatives. He does so even though financial
derivatives will in fact regularly constitude only a fairly low proportion of assets categorised as
HFT. The reasons why we expect a balance sheet category labeled as “Held for Trading” to be
representative for a company’s use of financial derivatives are at least twofold. Firstly, although
the categorisation of financial instruments is mostly left to the management’s discretion, this
is not the case for derivatives. Instead all derivatives have to be categorised as trading assets
without exception. All other financial assets can be assigned to this category by choice. In-
vestors might, however, tend to neglect that normally the proportion of non-derivative assets a
company has invested in exceeds the proportion of derivative assets by far.4 Therefore investors
will overestimate the probability of derivative assets although non-derivative assets are the most
probable financial instruments found in the trading category. Secondly, from research in mental
accounting individual investors are known to be well aware of specific instruments being used
as speculative investments (Shefrin & Statman (2000)). Trading assets are regularly associated
with speculative purposes (Young (1996)) and financial derivatives are probably the most promi-
nent financial instrument used for speculative investments (Trombley (2003)). Investors might
therefore easily neglect that the financial instruments most widely used for speculative invest-
ments are non-derivative in nature so that the overall probability of a company’s engagement in
derivatives is still relatively small if a trading asset is presented.
Likewise we expect the use of the L&R category to be representative for an investment in
consumer loans. The label of the L&R category indicates that it is exclusively introduced for
loan-like products. This is misleading for at least two reasons. Firstly, consumer loans can
generally be classified in any category, i.e. as available for sale, as designated at fair value or
as held to maturity.5 As we argue below, however, we do not expect the available for sale and
the fair value category to be representative for any particular financial instrument, because both
are intentionally designed as to be applied to a wide range of different financial instruments.
4 In other terms, the base rate of non-derivative assets is substantially higher than that of derivative assets.
5 The held to maturity category is hardly used by financial institution and for reasons of materiality not considered
in our analysis, see Nelson, Wohlmannstetter, Ferron-Jolys, & Labuschagne (2008) for details.
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Secondly, financial products that are not loan-like can be classified in the L&R category as
well. This is true at least for all interest-linked securities and trade receivables that are not
traded on any active market. Investors will therefore be likely to neglect the probability of a
company that does not present the L&R category to be engaged in consumer loans and, at the
same time, to overestimate the probability of a company that does present the L&R category to
have invested in consumer loans.
As it is summarised in the left section of Figure 3, we further hypothesise that representa-
tiveness is not used as a heuristic in the risk assessment of a company opting for the available
for sale category or the fair value category. Neither one indicates a particular purpose or is
subject to particular restrictions. The fair value option allows companies a broad application
of this category for a wide range of different financial instruments, and the available for sale
category is applied to those financial instruments which are not put into any other category. It
is thus hardly possible to theoretically derive a specific kind of instrument that investors con-
sider to be representative of either category. The fair value category, though, requires more
careful attention. Fair value in general was discussed in the context of both the measurement of
financial derivatives and the measurement of subprime loans. We can only more generally hy-
pothesise that investors will associate the fair value category itself with certain events covered
in the media so that risk assessment does not need to rely on the link via representativeness.
Cognitive available current information on fair value measurement is very likely to be negative
since over the last years the practice of fair value measurement has continuously been facing
public criticism from different sides (Sunder (2008); European Central Bank (2004)). Lacking
such particular associations with the available for sale category we expect it to be perceived as
comparatively low risk.
We are now able to summarise this framework under three hypotheses.
H1a: Risk perception of economically identical companies varies with the measurement cate-
gories used to present financial instruments.
H1b: Measurement categories presented on the face of the balance sheet will be perceived to
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be representative for specific financial instruments. In particular, a category labeled as
“Held for Trading” will be viewed as representative for financial derivatives and a cate-
gory labeled as “Loans & Receivables” as representative for loans to private consumers.
H1c: The differences in the risk perception of the companies depend on the cognitive avail-
ability of negative events in conjunction with financial derivatives and consumer loans in
particular and with fair value measurement in general.
Biases in the Risk Perception of Financial Instruments Based on the Footnotes
The perception of financial instruments that are presented in accordance with IAS 39 and IFRS 7
does not only rely on the line items on the face of the balance sheet but also on extensive
explanation in the footnotes. Corresponding experimental evidence is provided for example
by Dietrich, Kachelmeier, Kleinmuntz, & Linsmeier (2001) and Bloomfield & Libby (1996)
who analyse the effect on market prices of easily accessible information (on the balance sheet)
versus less easily accessible information (in the notes) about the same underlying situation.
They find a correspondance between footnote information and market prices (albeit a weaker
one than between balance sheet information and market prices). When financial instruments
are presented by measurement categories, an effect of footnote disclosure might result from
the heterogeneity among investors in the association of a balance sheet category with a type of
financial instrument. In the absence of notes investors rely on representativeness in the judgment
whether a category labeled as “Trading Assets” contains financial derivatives or whether the
category labeled as “Loans & Receivables” contains consumer loans. This will very likely result
in at least some degree of variability in the individual associations of financial instruments with
balance sheet categories. Since hypotheses H1a-c suggest that the type of financial instrument
which a particular category is viewed to be representative for causally explains the perception
of a company’s risk (in lieu of the balance sheet category itself), there will be a corresponding
degree of variability in perceived risk.
This indirect link between the availability of negative outcomes of investments in a type of
financial instrument to the perceived risk of a measurement category turns into a direct link via
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the notes. In other words, we expect investors to adjust their individual associations of balance
sheet categories with financial instruments upon studying the notes since the types of financial
instruments are then directly at their disposal. In consequence, the perception of a company’s
risk is likely to change if the instruments actually accounted for in the categories differ from
those formerly believed to be in there. The risk perception of a company is now mainly driven
by the types of financial instruments listed in the notes and thus directly by the availability
of investment outcomes experienced or broadly covered in the media. It is therefore plausible
that the risk perception resulting from the indirect link, i.e. from an individual and therefore
imperfect association, will be altered when the link between a balance sheet category and the
type of financial instrument is directly explained in the footnotes.
Among all investors some will be more prone to adjust their judgment than others. There-
fore, we further strive to identify the explanatory factors of the individual adjustment decision.
With respect to the risk perception of different types of financial instruments, the findings of
Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005) and Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer (2005) suggest that indi-
vidual judgment is based on behavioural risk dimensions as identified by Slovic (1987). Those
dimensions, Unknown and Dread, capture notions of familiarity with a risk and possible con-
sequences of this risk, respectively (Hodder, Koonce, & McAnally (2001)). They translate into
behavioural variables such as an investor’s prior knowledge about a risk or controllability, ob-
servability and immediacy of potentially catastrophic effects of a risk on one’s own welfare.
As Slovic (1987) points out, these variables are regularly intuitively estimated and rely heav-
ily on external factors such as media coverage, personal experience or distance, be it temporal
or spatial, to certain events. According to that theory, differences in risk judgement might be
caused by differences in personal experience in investment decisions. When analysing the risk
perception we capture this factor that is innate to investors via a personal questionnaire.
In summary, our second research question asks how further explanations of financial instru-
ments in the footnotes alter the perception of a company’s risk as opposed to a perception
solely based on the balance sheet categories. In order to answer this question, we will test two
hypotheses:
14
H2a: The perception of the companies’ risk alters when companies are not only judged on the
basis of their balance sheet items but also on the basis of footnotes explaining which type
of financial instrument is accounted for in each category.
H2b: This change in risk perception is associated with personal investment experience.
3 Experimental Design
The two experiments conducted to test the hypotheses differ in the manipulation of participants’
availability of media coverage of particular financial instruments.
3.1 Participants
Participants were 302 (Experiment 1) and 129 (Experiment 2) graduate students in business.
All students voluntarily participated in the experiment. We chose graduate students to proxy for
non-professional investors. There is some evidence that this choice is a good proxy at least in
experimental settings of relatively low complexity (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk (2007),
Kadous, Krische, & Sedor (2006) and Harper, Mister, & Strawser (1987)). Our study is of low
complexity as participants were asked to judge the risk of companies that only differed in very
few line items or footnotes. The quality of the proxy particularly relies on the facts that graduate
business students have in general already completed a core curriculum of accounting and finance
lectures and that they have some personal experience in capital market investments. We have
controlled for these factors and found that all participants had indeed successfully completed
at least one course in finance (on average 1.79 in Experiment 1 and 2.16 in Experiment 2)
and at least two courses in financial accounting (on average 2.76 in Experiment 1 and 2.93 in
Experiment 2). Only 37.97% (42.42%) of the participants however stated that they had some
practical experience with financial market investments. The relatively low rate is due to the
organisation of the graduate business studies in Germany which does not require professional
experience or internships per se. This is taken into account when analysing the results at a
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later point. We conducted the study at three different public universities in order to exclude
effects from the particular curriculum of any university and to consider students in different
stages of their graduate studies. The necessity of observations from two different experiments
is another reason why we considerered the use of professional participants to be inappropriate
and inefficient (Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson (2002)).
3.2 Procedure
Experiment 1
We were able to test H1a, H2a, and H2b in a joint experimental setting in which we used a
4×2 within-participants design. The first independent variable of interest is the balance sheet
category under which a financial instrument can be presented. In accordance with IAS 39, we
named these categories “Held for Trading”, “Measured at Fair Value through Profit and Loss”,
“Available for Sale”, and “Loans & Receivables”. The second independent variable is the extent
of the disclosure. It is varied between pure balance sheet disclosure and disclosure of balance
sheets with accompanying footnotes. Only the latter option reveals the type of financial instru-
ments accounted for in the reported measurement categories. As dependent variable, we use a
measure of a company’s relative risk as perceived by the participants. More precisely, partici-
pants were asked to rank the companies according to their risk in descending order (with rank 1
indicating the highest and rank 4 indicating the lowest risk). The study consists of two parts and
a final survey on personal characteristics. The three parts were conducted subsequently during
a single session of about 25 minutes. In order to ensure the correct sequence we explained the
procedure beforehand.
In the first stage of the experiment, each participant was provided with four balance sheets of
seemingly different companies and was asked to order the companies with respect to their risk.
In fact the four companies are economically identical just as shown in Figure 2 and only differ
in the manipulation of the first independent variable (balance sheet category). Since ties were
explicitly allowed in the ordering procedure, a participant recognising the economic identity of
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the four companies could reflect this in his answer.
In the second stage of the experiment, each participant was provided with the same four
balance sheets now supplemented by footnotes explaining the type of the financial instrument
the company is engaged in as well as the measurement base chosen. Information about the in-
tended use of these instruments within the company (such as hedging or speculation), however,
was withheld. Participants were then again asked to order the companies with respect to their
risk. The participants did not learn until the second stage that the one company presenting a
better debt-to-equity ratio had entered into a derivative contract whereas the other three com-
panies had not. The difference in labels used for the measurement categories on the face of the
balance sheet persisted but, in addition, the measurement base (fair value or amortized cost)
arising from a category’s application under IAS 39 was disclosed. The balance sheets and the
footnotes used in the experiment are included in the appendix to this paper.
We opted for a within-participants design for this setting because previous experiments on the
evaluation of alternatives have shown that participants might find it difficult to make absolute
risk judgements of financial instruments since risk is a relative measure and therefore difficult
to evaluate independently (Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005) and Hsee (1996)). A relative risk
judgement requires knowledge of several alternatives which can only be provided in a within-
subjects design. The internal validity of the within-subjects design depends on how well the
effect of external factors on the dependent variable is controlled. By counterbalancing the order
of the four conditions in each stage using a Latin square design, we prevent effects based on
presentation sequence in the experiment. We did conduct all experiments without previous
notice at the beginning of class to ensure high concentration and task focus.
Experiment 2
Since participants’ natural availability of associations with certain financial instruments, which
hypotheses H1b and H1c refer to, cannot be directly observed, a slightly different experimental
design was necessary for the second stage of research. Using the same experimental setting and
the same task of ranking companies according to their risk, we now manipulated the availability
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of negative associations with either derivatives or consumer loans in a between-participants
design so that overall a 4×2×2 design results. We did so by providing the students with excerpts
from popular press articles by Warren Buffett in the Fortune magazine and by Larry Summers in
the Financial Times. The Buffett article dramatises the dangers and risks for the capital market
resulting from derivatives usage in general and hedge funds in particular. We expected this
article to enhance the availability of negative associations with derivatives. The Summers article
concerns the recent subprime crisis in the US and predicts additional write-offs of housing loans
as well as a spread of the crisis to other credit segments. We expected this article to enhance
the availability of negative associations with loans. In order to ensure that our manipulations
worked we asked participants to answer four questions regarding the content of the respective
article received.
4 Results
4.1 Risk perception of financial instruments with and without footnotes
(H1a and H2a)
In the first situation where availability is not manipulated and participants judge the risk of
the four companies solely based on information from the balance sheets, the results indicate
that a presentation by measurement categories does not reveal the economic identity of the four
companies but rather causes a bias in individual risk perception. As shown in Table 1, Company
B, using the fair value category (with a mean of 2.26), and Company D, using the loans category
(2.19), are perceived to be of the highest risk. Company C, using the available-for-sale category
(2.59), is perceived to be of average risk. Company A, which presents the trading category and
which has, due to the off-balance-sheet approach in accounting for financial derivatives, the
best debt-to-equity ratio, turns out to cause the lowest risk perception (2.96). All differences
except for the one between Companies B and D are significant at the 1% level in a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (Table 2, Panel A). We therefore clearly fail to reject hypothesis (H1a) that
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differently labeled measurement categories are perceived to be of different risk.
Table 1:
Analysis of risk judgements by measurement category and additional disclosure a
Panel A: Descriptive statistics -Mean Rank (Standard Deviation)
Accounting treatment Without notes With notes Difference
(p-Value)
A Held for trading (n=284) 2.96 2.64 < .0001
(1.27) (1.32)
B Fair value through P&L (n=284) 2.26 2.49 < .0001
(.88) (.89)
C Available for sale (n=284) 2.59 2.6 ns
(.87) (.88)
D Loans & Receivables (n=284) 2.19 2.27 ns
(1.02) (1.07)
Panel B: ANOVA (Interaction)
Source df Sum of squares Mean square F-statistic p-Value
Measurement
category
3 109.9 36.63 33.99 < .001
Measurement
category × notes
4 24.16 6.04 5.6 < .001
Error 2331 2512.31 1.08
Total 2338 2647.75 1.13
a Table 1 shows the results of Experiment 1 which investigates how participants rank investment alternatives that
differ only in the disclosure of financial instruments (Rank 1 =̂ highest risk). Panel A shows summary statistics by
category and exposure to additional information in the form of notes plus the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
on changes in the distribution of ranks by exposure to the notes. Panel B shows the interaction of measurement
category and exposure to the notes. ’ns’ indicates non-significant results.
The spread between the minimum and the maximum mean decreases in the second situation
from .77 to .37 after participants are exposed to the additional disclosure in the footnotes. The
order of the ranks, however, remains unchanged (Table 1, Panel A). An analysis of variance
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(ANOVA) indicates that the differences between the mean ranks are highly significant in both
situations (p < .001). Since the sum of the ranks assigned to the companies is constant across
participants, we are dealing with ipsative data and cannot account for within-subjects variation.
Even though we need to interpret those results conservatively (Steenkamp, Allenby, Gupta, &
Verducci (2001)), we can conclude that the disclosure choices left to management’s discretion
by IAS 39 and IFRS 7 do not allow investors to unambiguously recognise economically identi-
cal risks if companies apply different disclosure options. Additional disclosure can reduce this
bias but it does not disappear. As shown in Table 1, Panel B, exposure to the footnotes, i.e. to
additional information indicating the type of financial instrument, has an effect on the relative
risk assessment of the companies that interacts with the effect of the measurement categories
(p < .001). Again due to the analysis of ipsative data where the sum of the ranks assigned
to the companies does not vary between the situation before and the situation after additional
disclosure, an individual effect of exposure to footnotes cannot be identified.
Besides this overall analysis, it is insightful to compare the effect of additional disclosure on
the perception of the different measurement categories individually. Table 1 gives test statistics
for this finding in Panel A. In particular, we test for a change in the mean ranks of companies
after participants were exposed to the footnote indicating that Company A is party to a deriva-
tive contract whereas the other three companies are not. We find these individual differences to
be significant for the trading category and for the fair value category (p < 0.001 for both). With
notes, participants rank Company A significantly lower, i.e. as being of higher risk, and Com-
pany B significantly higher, i.e. as being of lower risk, than without the notes. We therefore also
fail to reject hypothesis (H2a) that footnotes have an effect on the risk perception of financial
instruments. Given that the notes for Company A only state that the category “Held for trad-
ing” does contain derivatives and that the notes for Company B merely state that the fair value
category does contain securities measured at fair value, the shift in relative risk could have been
caused by either the realisation that Company A unexpectedly has derivatives in its portfolio
or by the realisation that Company B unexpectedly has not. Either way, the shift suggests that
the label “derivative” triggers an increase in risk perception. This switching behaviour will be
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Table 2:
Analysis of risk judgements by measurement categories before disclosure of footnotes b
Panel A: Contrasts without notes - Statistic, adjusted p-value
Comparison t-Statistic p-value
FV vs. HFT -8.37 .0000
AFS vs. HFT -4.50 .0000
L&R vs. HFT -9.30 .0000
AFS vs. FV 3.88 .0007
L&R vs. FV -0.92 ns
L&R vs. AFS -4.80 .0000
Panel B: ANOVA (Measurement category without notes)
Source df Sum of squares Mean square F-statistic p-Value
Measurement
category
3 112.57 37.52 26.96 < .001
Error 1184 1235.93 1.39
Total 1187 1348.5 1.14
b Table 2 shows the results of our experiment which investigated how participants ranked investment alternatives
which differed in reporting treatment of financial instruments (Rank 1 =̂ highest risk). Panel A shows the results
of multiple comparisons of means (Linear Tukey contrasts) in an ANOVA. Panel B shows the results of an
ANOVA on the observed ranks before exposure to the notes. ’ns’ indicates non-significant results.
subject to a more detailed analysis in section 4.3.
Our hypotheses are however not only directed towards the perception of derivatives but also
towards consumer loans. In this respect, the relative risk-ranking of Company D where the
lending contracts replicating the financial derivative are presented as “Loans and Receivables”
is of interest. Financial instruments in this category are measured at cost and thus cause little
volatility. Participants, however, perceive Company D as the most risky investment opportunity
notwithstanding the exposure to footnotes. While exposure to the notes eliminates significant
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differences between the other companies’ rankings (Table 3, Panel A), Company D remains to
be ranked significantly lower, i.e. as being of higher risk, than all other companies. One poten-
tial explanation is again an availability effect, i.e. that the current crisis in the worldwide credit
market and the ensuing negative media coverage has sensitised participants for counterparty
risk associated with consumer loans. Due to its recentness, this effect has not been observed in
prior research. Verification of this interpretation is left to Experiment 2.
Table 3:
Analysis of risk judgements by measurement categories after disclosure of footnotes c
Panel A: Contrasts with notes - Statistic, adjusted p-value
Comparison t-Statistic p-value
FV vs. HFT -1.72 ns
AFS vs. HFT -0.45 ns
L&R vs. HFT -4.13 <.001
AFS vs. FV 1.27 ns
L&R vs. FV -2.41 .0757
L&R vs. AFS -3.67 .0014
Panel B: ANOVA (Measurement category with notes)
Source df Sum of squares Mean square F-statistic p-Value
Measurement
category
3 22.87 7.62 6.85 < .001
Error 1147 1276.38 1.11
Total 1150 1299.25 1.13
c Table 3 shows the results of our experiment which investigated how participants ranked investment alternatives
which differed in reporting treatment of financial instruments (Rank 1 =̂ highest risk). Panel A shows the results
of multiple comparisons of means (Linear Tukey contrasts) in an ANOVA. Panel B shows the results of an
ANOVA on the observed ranks after exposure to the notes. ’ns’ indicates non-significant results.
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4.2 Behavioural explanations for the risk assessment of financial
instruments (H1b and H1c)
In the analysis of experiment 2, we can concentrate on the differences that are caused by the
availability manipulations. In order to ensure that the manipulations work, we only include
observations of participants who answered at least three of the four control questions correctly
and thereby eliminate 20 observations. With respect to hypothesis (H1c), Table 4 reveals that
availability of associations with derivatives and with consumer loans alters the risk participants
assign to the individual companies when compared with the risk assigned in experiment 1 in
which availability is not manipulated. We therefore fail to reject hypothesis (H1c). Specifi-
cally, this effect occurs for companies that present trading assets or the L&R category. Since
the information by which associations are made available is product-specific and the alteration
varies with the type of product-specific information, there seems to be some link between avail-
ability of product-specific associations and risk perception of measurement categories. In the
development of hypothesis (H1b), we have argued that this link can be established via the rep-
resentativeness heuristic. The further results of experiment 2 allow us to test (H1b) to some
degree.
Trading assets
Participants being confronted with the Buffett article on the potential threats of usage of deriva-
tives and the concrete example of the LTCM breakdown do perceive the L&R category as signif-
icantly less risky than participants who are not manipulated accordingly (2.48 vs. 2.19, p< .05).
Awareness of the risks from loans seems here to be suppressed by the ease of recalling the risks
from derivatives. Since risk assessment in the experiment is in relative terms, this is tantamount
to a relatively higher risk perception of the trading category. This observation suggests on the
one hand that the use of the L&R category is not viewed to be representative for engagement in
financial derivatives. On the other hand the finding is in conformity with our hypothesis (H1b)
that it is the trading category that is viewed to be representative for derivatives usage.
Those findings also shed some light on the puzzlingly low risk perception of trading assets in
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Table 4:
Analysis of risk judgements by measurement category and availability effects d
Panel A: Relative Risk Judgment (Standard Deviation) before Exposure to Footnotes
Accounting treatment Buffett Summers Difference
(n=45) (n=64) (p-Value)
Held for trading 2.82 3.19* .0631
(1.29) (1.17)
Fair value through P&L 2.26 2.19 ns
(1.01) (.92)
Available for sale 2.44 2.44 ns
(.92) (1.01)
Loans & Receivables 2.48** 2.18 .0448
(.88) (.91)
Panel B: Relative Risk Judgment (Standard Deviation) after Exposure to Footnotes
Accounting treatment Buffett Summers Difference
(n=45) (n=64) (p-Value)
Held for trading 2.13*** 2.76 .0067
(1.31) (1.21)
Fair value through P&L 2.54 2.44 ns
(.86) (.99)
Available for sale 2.66 2.55 ns
(.73) (.97)
Loans & Receivables 2.67** 2.43 .0288
(1.08) (1.11)
d Table 4 shows the results of Experiment 2 which investigates how participants rank investment alternatives
that only differ in disclosure of financial instruments (Rank 1 =̂ highest risk) by manipulating the availability of
certain events involving corporate engagement in financial instruments. In the ’Buffett’ situation, participants are
confronted with a press article pointing to the potential threats of derivatives usage. In the ’Summers’ situation,
participants are confronted with a press article pointing to the counterparty risk of consumer loans as observed
during the latest subprime crisis. Panel A shows summary statistics for both situation before exposure to footnotes.
Panel B shows summary statistics for both situations after exposure to footnotes. All differences are calculated
in one-sided t-tests assuming unequal variances. ’ns’ indicates non-significant results. ***, **, and * indicate a
significant difference from the corresponding rank observed in Experiment 1 as summarized in Panel A of Table 1
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Experiment 1 when availability is not manipulated. Tables 2 and 3 show that the mean rank of
Company A is higher than the average ranks of all other alternatives before additional disclosure
(p < .01) and that it is still higher than the mean rank of the loans category after additional
disclosure (p < .01). >From the experimental setting, we can identify two possible explanations
since the balance sheet of the four companies vary both in the measurement category used
in labeling the financial instruments and (in the specific case of Company A) in face value.
Initially, the low risk ranking of Company A observed in Experiment 1 can be attributable to
either factor.
The results of Experiment 2 now show that participants, when being easily aware of Buffett’s
warnings on the use of derivatives, rank this category as the riskiest one after the exposure
to footnotes revealed the company’s engagement in derivatives (Table 4, Panel B). This finding
suggests that the observation from Experiment 1 cannot be due to the labeling effect, i.e. to a low
risk that investors might associate with derivatives usage and thereby with the trading category
the use of which is viewed to be representative for an investment in derivatives. If the labeling
effect fails as explanation, only the difference in face value between Company A and the other
companies remains as a causal factor. The difference in face value results from the off-balance-
sheet approach in accounting for financial derivatives and it finds its expression both in a lower
debt-to-equity ratio and in a lower ratio of financial assets to total assets of Company A.6 If we
accept that the counterparty risk of derivatives is indeed lower than the one of non-derivative
replications, participants’ low risk perception of Company A in Experiment 1 is economically
correct. We can thus conclude that negative effects arising from the representativeness of a
company’s use of the trading category for investments in financial derivatives are offset by
the off-balance-sheet accounting of derivatives. This finding can then be regarded as a further
justification of the general off-balance-sheet approach in accounting for derivatives.
Loans & Receivables
Participants being confronted with the Summers article on the latest subprime crisis that was
6 The latter does only explain the relative ranking if participants perceive financial assets to be contributing more
to a company’s risk than other assets.
25
mainly triggered by investments in consumer loans do perceive the held for trading category
containing the derivatives as significantly less risky than participants who are not manipulated
accordingly (3.19 vs. 2.96, p < .10). Awareness of the risks from derivatives seems here to
be suppressed by the ease of recalling the risks from loans. Since risk assessment is again in
relative terms, this is tantamount to a relatively higher risk perception of the L&R category. We
can thus conclude that a company’s use of the trading category is not viewed to be representative
for investments in consumer loans whereas the L&R category is. This finding also conforms to
our hypothesis (H1b).
Our hypothesis (H1b) is also supported by evidence from the cross-group analysis in the last
column of Table 4, Panel A. The difference in the mean rank of the L&R category between
the two manipulations is significant in the hypothesised direction and so is the difference in
the mean rank of the trading category (albeit at a lower level of significance). It is striking that
even after exposure to footnotes only these two categories are affected by the manipulations and
that the same two differences remain significant (Table 4, Panel B). With respect to the L&R
category, this is again in conformity with our hypothesis (H1b) which expects the use of the
L&R category to be viewed as representative for an investment in consumer loans. Participants
obviously neglect the probability of consumer loans being classified in another category and
overestimate the probability that a company that presents the L&R category has invested in
consumer loans.
Fair value category
The interpretation of the findings on the fair value category is more complex since the ranking
of Company B is not affected by the manipulations. In all cases, however, company B is per-
ceived to be of relatively high risk. Participants obviously regard fair value measurement as a
severe risk factor independent of the kind of financial instrument they are easily aware of. This
suggests that fair value measurement is viewed to representative for at least not only financial
derivatives. The category can indeed be widely used both for financial innovations and for tra-
ditional consumer loans. These findings are in conformity with our hypothesis (H1c) that fair
value measurement in general is associated with certain negative events which, however, can
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not be exactly identified in our study. Generally speaking, we can only speculate that this is
what investors have learned from the current debate on the economic causes of the subprime
crisis which is centering right around fair value measurement (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, &
Shin (2008) and Ryan (2008)).
4.3 The impact of investor characteristics on the perception of footnote
disclosure (H2b)
Model
Our findings in Experiment 1 suggest that the disclosure of derivatives usage has an impact
on the risk perception of both company A and company B. Whereas company A (HFT) ranks
significantly higher in relative risk after exposure to the information that a financial derivative
is indeed classified in the trading category, company B (FV) ranks significantly lower after
exposure to the information that the company is not engaged in financial derivatives. These
opposite effects are visualised in Figure 4.
In the analysis of risk perception before exposure to footnotes, it is striking that the distribu-
tion of company A’s ranks is U-shaped as shown in the first histogram of Figure 5. The company
is thus considered to be of an extreme (i.e. either of the highest or of the lowest) risk by a vast
majority of participants. This U-shape is due to the offsetting effect of the two factors manipu-
lated in the experiment and identified in section 4.2: Company A’s use of the trading category
has a negative effect on participants’ risk perception and off-balance-sheet accounting for the
derivative has a positive effect. Rankings for company A remain U-shaped after participants
are exposed to the footnote stating that company A has been using financial derivatives (Figure
6). The number of participants assigning an extreme rank is almost unchanged (235 before and
221 after footnote disclosure). A more thorough analysis however reveals that the number of
participants ranking company A as the one of highest risk increases after exposure to footnotes
whereas the number of participants ranking company A as the one of lowest risk decreases.7
7 In χ2-tests both before and after footnote disclosure, we are in fact able to reject the hypotheses that the ranks
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Figure 4:
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As pointed out in section 2, some degree of heterogeneity in participants’ association of fi-
nancial derivatives with the trading category will account for this adjustment of individual risk
assessment. Those participants who initially have not viewed the trading category as repre-
sentative for engagement in financial derivatives and have therefore associated a low risk with
company A are likely to alter this judgement after unambiguously learning about the company’s
derivatives usage if they attach a greater weight to the general risk of financial derivatives than
to the company’s favorable debt-to-equity ratio. The substantial number of participants contin-
uously ranking company A as the one of lowest risk results, as before, from the positive effects
on the debt-to-equity ratio of off-balance-sheet accounting for the derivative, which causes par-
ticipants to merely disregard the risk of derivatives.8
are uniformly distributed and that the two distributions are identical (p < .001 for all tests).
8 There will also be individual participants associating financial derivatives with some notions of insurance and
thus deliberately assigning a high rank (i.e. a low risk) to company A.
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Figure 5:
Company rankings without notes
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The weight that investors attach to these two offsetting factors is a function of their individual
risk perception. The literature summarised in section 2 suggests that risk perception is explained
by behavioural risk variables and is thus associated with natural characteristics of investors,
in particular with personal investment experience. In order to examine these associations we
capture the effect of an increasing risk perception for company A with a binary variable for
those individuals that ranked company A as the company of lowest risk in the first stage. We will
refer to this dependent variable as ASWITCH. It takes a value of 1 if the ranking of company A
decreases by more than two ranks, i.e. the perceived risk increases considerably, and a value of
0 otherwise. In terms of the histograms shown in Figures 5 and 6, ASWITCH captures a switch
from the very right to the very left bar for company A.
When assuming normality in the distribution of the error terms, the probability of a participant
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Figure 6:
Company rankings with notes
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adjusting the risk assessment can then be described as
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi) =Φ(X ′iβ)
for participants i = 1,2, . . . ,n where Yi denotes individual i’s scores on ASWITCH and Xi de-
notes a vector of individual-level variables. In this vector, a participant’s investment experience
(EXPER) is the behavioural risk factor used as explanatory variable. In order to capture only the
marginal effect of investment experience on risk judgement, we further include several control
variables in the vector X which varies in scope and content between model I and model II.
To begin with, an adjustment of the risk assessment can be caused by a participant’s erro-
neous assumption, before exposure to footnotes, that another company than A is using financial
derivatives. DERNHFT indicates whether a participant associated another category than “Held
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for Trading” with the use of derivatives. This variable is measured at the very beginning of the
experiment when participants are asked which types of financial instruments they expect to be
contained in the four relevant categories. Secondly, risk judgement is influenced by availabil-
ity effects as it is demonstrated in experiment 2. Since availability of media coverage on the
use of derivatives is not manipulated in experiment 1, we have to control for differences in the
participants’ given availability of negative media coverage on derivatives usage. MEDIANEG
and MEDIADIF are the variables chosen to proxy for the availability of such media coverage.
MEDIANEG, measuring the absolute availability of negative media coverage, is used in model
I and MEDIAREL, measuring the relative availability of negative media coverage when com-
pared to the availability of positive media coverage, is used in model II. Both variables are
inquired about in a short questionnaire at the very end of the experiment.
In addition, model II includes two other variables that potentially explain risk judgement in
general. CONFJUDG reflects a participant’s confidence in his own judgement in particular and
TRUSTFR reflects individual trust in risk assessments solely based on a company’s financial
reports. Together they shall control for the noise in the risk judgement that is due to a partici-
pant’s individual difficulty in risk assessment on the basis of the provided information. These
variables are also inquired about in the questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are summarised in Table 5. As a first indicator of the
validity of our assumptions regarding the drivers of ASWITCH and to test for multicollinear-
ity, Table 6 shows the Spearman correlation coefficients. It shows no collinearity between the
independent variables with the exception of MEDIANEG and MEDIAREL, which is hardly
surprising since the latter is constructed from the former. Moreover, it gives preliminary sup-
port to our hypothesis H2b for it shows statistically significant correlations between ASWITCH
and EXPER, MEDIANEG and MEDIAREL respectively.
Statistical tests
The results of the two probit regressions, i.e. of the regressions of ASWITCH on model I and
on model II, are summarised in Table 7. Our hypothesis H2b focuses on investment experience
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Table 5:
Binary regression models: Descriptive statisticse
Variable Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum
ASWITCH 0.2601 0.4400 0 1
EXPER 0.3797 0.4862 0 1
DERNHFT 0.3311 0.4722 0 1
MEDIADIF 20.2025 38.4222 -100 100
MEDIAREL 39.9385 40.6076 0 100
CONFJUDG 23.5226 20.7310 0 100
TRUSTFR 45.7850 23.3233 0 100
e Definition of the regressors:
ASWITCH 1 if Rank of Company A with notes - Rank of Company A without notes ≥ 2; 0 otherwise
EXPER 1 if participant has private or professional experience with investment decisions
DERNHFT 1 if participant associates any category other than “Held for Trading” with derivatives; 0
otherwise
MEDIANEG ease with which participant can remember negative media coverage of derivatives (0 not
at all; 100 very easy)
MEDIAREL difference between ease to recall negative and ease to recall positive media coverage of
derivatives
CONFJUDG participant’s confidence in own risk judgment based on the information provided (0 not
confident; 100 completely confident)
TRUSTFR participant’s trust in financial reports as a tool to assess risk (0 not suitable; 100 com-
pletely suitable)
as the explanatory behavioural variable. In an individual test for the ASWITCH regression, the
positive coefficient of EXPER differs from zero at a 5% (1%) level of significance in model I
(model II). There is thus quite robust evidence that the switch in the risk assessment of company
A after exposure to footnotes describing the company’s derivatives usage is associated with the
behavioural risk variable used in our model and we finally fail to reject hypothesis H2b. The size
of the coefficient suggests that professional familiarity with financial investments in derivatives
increases the probability of such a switch by approximately 25-30% if all other variables are
set to their mean values. A higher familiarity thus comes along with a higher sensitivity to the
label “derivative”. This is in conformity with behavioural theory since investment experience is
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Table 6:
Correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables f
ASWITCH EXPER DERNHFT MEDIANEG MEDIAREL CONFJUDG
EXPER 0.2527 1.0000
(0.0362)
DERNHFT 0.1830 -0.0089 1.0000
(0.1323) (0.9421)
MEDIANEG 0.2907 -0.0625 0.1892 1.0000
(0.0154) (0.6098) (0.1194)
MEDIAREL 0.2607 -0.0837 0.0855 0.7977 1.0000
(0.0305) (0.49439 (0.4850) (0.0000)
CONFJUDG -0.1781 -0.0759 0.1604 0.0426 -0.1175 1.0000
(0.1433) (0.53559 (0.1880) (0.7282) (0.3364)
TRUSTFR 0.0574 -0.0934 -0.1099 -0.2009 -0.1228 0.1440
(0.6393) (0.4452) (0.3685) (0.0979) (0.3147) (0.2377)
f Reported are Spearman correlation coefficients, which account for the fact that some variables (ASWITCH,
DERNHFT) are by nature not normally distributed. p-values are reported in parentheses. For a description of the
variables see Table 5.
tantamount to a higher familiarity with the risks arising from derivatives usage.
With respect to the controls, the coefficients of MEDIANEG and MEDIADIF suggest that a
higher natural availability (in absolute or relative terms) of negative media coverage of deriva-
tives is associated with a higher probability of substantially altering the risk judgement. This is
also exactly what behavioural theory predicts and it underlines our findings from Experiment 2.
Even when availability effects are not manipulated, individual awareness of media coverage is
a strong external factor associated with the sensitivity of a participant’s reaction to a company’s
usage of derivatives.
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Table 7:
Binary regression models: Coefficients and average derivatives (Probit)g
Dependent variable ASWITCH
Model I II
N 70 69
(#) (+) (#) (+)
Test Variable
EXPER* .7970 .2592 1.0149 .3236
(.3504) (.3954)
Control Variables
DERNHFT* .4290 .1405 .8647 .2815
(.3532) (.3897)
MEDIANEG .0103 .0033 - -
(.0042) -
MEDIAREL - - .0102 .0032
- (.0047)
CONFJUDG - - -.0209 -.0064
- (.0119)
TRUSTFR - - .0164 .0051
- (.0094)
CONSTANT -1.6233 - -1.9370 -
(.3765) (.6831)
ln L -35.39 -32.85
% correctly predicted 72.86 76.81
χ2 (p-value) 12.97 (< .01) 17.37 (< .01)
g (#) The coefficients of the probit regression are reported with the standard errors in parentheses.
(+) dy/dx is evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. For binary variables marked with an asterisk (*),
dy/dx is equal to the difference in the probability of y=1 between values of x of 1 and 0.
For a description of the variables see Table 5.
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5 Implications and Conclusions
This study demonstrates that the discretion offered by IAS 39 and IFRS 7 with respect to bal-
ance sheet classification has the potential to bias non-professional investors’ judgements about
the risk of the reporting company. By means of an experiment we show that a presentation of
financial instruments by measurement categories (as applied by a majority of European banks)
causes investors’ risk perception to vary with the balance sheet classification of financial instru-
ments. Because it has been shown that information in the footnotes receives considerably less
attention than information in the balance sheet or the profit and loss statement (Hodge, Kennedy,
& Maines (2004) and Harper, Mister, & Strawser (1987)) we consider this effect to severely im-
pair the decision usefulness of financial reports based on IFRS, although it is partly mitigated
when non-professional investors are provided with footnotes about the underlying financial in-
struments. Thus, distortions in perceived risk induced by balance sheet category are unlikely to
be fully corrected by the footnotes and may result in non-optimal investment decisions.
In particular, we observe on the one hand that both the “Loans and Receivables” and the “Fair
Value Instruments” are perceived to be of particularly high risk regardless of their underlying
economics. This holds especially in comparison with instruments “Available for Sale”. A
company using derivatives and presenting those as instruments “Held for Trading” is on the
other hand considered to be of particularly low risk which is mainly due to the off-balance-
sheet approach in accounting for derivatives. If however, derivatives usage is made explicit in
the footnotes, the risk of this company as perceived by investors significantly increases.
These results can be explained by both the availability and the representativeness heuristic.
When information about losses from corporate engagement in derivatives is easily available
to non-professional investors, a company presenting trading assets is judged to be particularly
risky even if investors have no information about the type of financial instruments actually
classified as trading assets. When information about the recent subprime crisis is easily avail-
able, a company presenting “Loans and Receivables” is judged to be particularly risky. In both
cases, a company presenting “Fair Value Instruments” is judged to be particularly risky. The
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presentation of trading assets is obviously seen to be representative for derivatives usage just
as the presentation of “Loans and Receivables” is seen to be representative for investment in
consumer loans whereas fair value measurement is regarded to be a risk factor regardless of the
information that is easily available.
Generally speaking, in the absence of footnotes non-professional investors seem to base their
risk judgement on the type of financial instruments a category is regarded to be representative
for. As a result, cognitive availability of events related to those types of instruments distorts
individual risk judgement that is based on information about a company’s use of measurement
categories. The distortion stems from the fact that IAS 39 allows a high degree of discretion
in the choice of a measurement category. By discretion, we mean that any reporting category
provided by IAS 39 can in fact contain a wide range of different financial instruments not at all
similar to the financial instrument typically inferred from the category’s label.
This study also contributes to the literature on individual perception of derivatives usage. We
identify two opposite effects that influence risk perception of derivatives relative to economi-
cally identical non-derivative contracts. The effect of the classification of derivatives as trading
assets on risk perception is negative but the effect of the general off-balance-sheet approach
in accounting for derivatives is positive. If we accept that financial derivatives are not used
as risk-enhancing but as risk-reducing instruments as it was suggested by Guay (1999), this
finding is a justification for the extant off-balance-sheet approach that substantially improves a
company’s debt-to-equity ratio and thereby reduces the distorting impact of the labeling effect
already identified by Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally (2005).
Overall, this study is a call for standard-setting activity. Just as a presentation by product,
a presentation of financial instruments by measurement categories causes significant biases in
the risk perception of non-professional investors. Those biases could be reduced either by a
reduction of management’s discretion in the choice of measurement categories or by the intro-
duction of a uniform presentation format that is neither based on measurement categories nor
on products but, for instance, on a company’s investment purposes. Such an approach would be
a further step towards a true management approach in the disclosure of financial instruments.
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A Information set with footnotes
Part 1
There exists a vast amount of different financial instruments in business practice. Financial accounting
according to IFRS demands classification of these financial instruments in different categories.
Imagine you are confronted with an IFRS financial statement which shows the following line items.
Which kinds of financial instruments do you expect to be contained in each of them?
Line item Financial instruments contained
Financial assets...
- held for trading
- at fair value through
profit and loss
- held to maturity
- available for sale
41
Part 2
You are in the position of a business advisor. Looking for investment opportunities on behalf of a client
you consider recommending various investments in company shares. The client did not express any
preferences over particular investments and relies entirely on your professional judgement. Part of this
judgement is the evaluation of the individual risk of prospective investments.
After considerable research you have narrowed down the list of potential investments to four companies,
with the following financial statements.
Company A
Assets Balance sheet Liabilities
Non-current assets Equity 200
Property, Plant & Equipment 100
Non-current liabilities 400
Financial assets
- Held-to-maturity 300
Current assets
Financial assets held-for-
trading
12
Receivables 100
Cash 88
600 600
Notes
Financial assets
This item contains investments in fixed interest-rate bonds with maturities between 8 and 10 years.
Receivables
Receivables are loans to customers the repayment of which is expected to occur within 6 to 12 months on average.
Their effective interest rate is equivalent to the respective average short-term interest rate of private consumer
banks.
Financial assets held-for-trading
This items contains only investments in financial derivatives.
Non-current liabilities
Non-current liabilities are fixed interest-rate bonds issued by company A with maturities between 8 and 10 years.
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Company B
Assets Balance sheet Liabilities
Non-current assets Equity 200
Property, Plant & Equipment 100
Non-current liabilities 500
Financial assets
- Held-to-maturity 300
- At fair value through
profit and loss
100
Current assets
Receivables 100
Cash 100
700 700
Notes
Financial assets
This item contains investments in fixed interest-rate bonds with maturities between 8 and 10 years. Assets with a
volume of 300 CU are classified as “Held-to-maturity” and measured at amortized cost. The remaining assets with
a volume of 100 CU are measured at fair value through profit and loss.
Receivables
Receivables are loans to customers the repayment of which is expected to occur within 6 to 12 months on average.
Their effective interest rate is equivalent to the respective average short-term interest rate of private consumer
banks.
Non-current liabilities
Non-current liabilities are bonds issued by company B with maturities between 8 and 10 years.
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Company C
Assets Balance sheet Liabilities
Non-current assets Equity 200
Property, Plant & Equipment 100
Non-current liabilities 500
Financial assets
- Held-to-maturity 300
- Available-for-sale 100
Current assets
Receivables 100
Cash 100
700 700
Notes
Financial assets
This item contains investments in fixed interest-rate bonds with maturities between 8 and 10 years. Assets with a
volume of 300 CU are classified as “Held-to-maturity” and measured at amortized cost. The remaining assets with
a volume of 100 CU are classified as “Available-for-sale” and measured at fair value directly through equity.
Receivables
Receivables are loans to customers the repayment of which is expected to occur within 6 to 12 months on average.
Their effective interest rate is equivalent to the respective average short-term interest rate of private consumer
banks.
Non-current liabilities
Non-current liabilities are bonds issued by company C with maturities between 8 and 10 years.
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Company D
Assets Balance sheet Liabilities
Non-current assets Equity 200
Property, Plant & Equipment 100
Non-current liabilities 500
Financial assets
- Held-to-maturity 300
- Loans and receivables 100
Current assets
Receivables 100
Cash 100
700 700
Notes
Financial assets
This item contains investments in fixed interest-rate bonds with maturities between 8 and 10 years. Assets with a
volume of 300 CU are classified as “Held-to-maturity” and measured at amortized cost. The remaining assets with
a volume of 100 CU are long-term financial receivables and are measured at amortized cost.
Receivables
Receivables are loans to customers the repayment of which is expected to occur within 6 to 12 months on average.
Their effective interest rate is equivalent to the respective average short-term interest rate of private consumer
banks.
Non-current liabilities
Non-current liabilities are bonds issued by company D with maturities between 8 and 10 years.
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Additional questions
At the end of this experiment we would like to ask you to answer the following general questions:
1. How would you characterise media coverage on investments in financial
derivatives? (0 = very negative; 100 = very positive)
2. Can you recall an event which resulted in positive media coverage of
financial derivatives? (0 = not at all; 100 = immediately)
3. Can you recall an event which resulted in negative media coverage of
financial derivatives? (0 = not at all; 100 = immediately)
4. Which of the following courses have you completed successfully?
[List of courses offered by the respective university]
5. Do you have professional investment experience (Training, Internship,
Job)?
yes
no
6. Did you privately invest money on the capital markets during the last
year?
yes
no
7. How confident did you feel during the experiment while evaluating risk
on basis of the balance and the footnotes? (0 = very insecure; 100 =
very confident)
8. Do consider financial reports an appropriate instrument for risk evalua-
tion? (0 = totally inappropriate; 100 = appropriate)
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B Manipulation of availability effects
Warren Buffett
Warren Buffett, a famous and successful US investor, writes a letter to shareholders of his com-
pany Berkshire Hathaway. You read this letter in a recent issue of the Fortune magazine:
I view derivatives as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the
economic system. Basically these instruments call for money to change hands
at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference
items, such as interest rates, stock prices, or currency values. (...) But the parties
to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them.
(...)
Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corpo-
ration has run into for completely unrelated reasons. It all becomes a spiral that can
lead to a corporate meltdown. (...) Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-
heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LCTM),
caused the Federal Reserve Bank anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a
rescue effort. In later Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that,
had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM (a firm unknown to the
general public and employing only a few hundred people) could well have posed
a serious threat to the stability of American markets. (...) One of the derivatives
instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100%
leverage in various markets, including stocks.
(...)
Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or
even monitor, the risks posed by derivatives. In my view, derivatives are financial
weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are poten-
tially lethal.
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Larry Summers
Larry Summers, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank and US Secretary of Treasury,
publishes weekly articles in the Financial Times. Today you read:
Three months ago it was reasonable to expect that the subprime credit crisis would
be a financially significant event but not one that would threaten the overall pat-
tern of economic growth. Several streams of data indicate how much more serious
the situation is than was clear a few months ago. First, forward-looking indicators
suggest that the housing sector may be in free-fall from what felt like the basement
levels of a few months ago. Single family home construction may be down over
the next year by as much as half from previous peak levels.
(...)
Second, it is now clear that only a small part of the financial distress that must be
worked through has yet been faced. (...) Estimates vary, but there is nearly uni-
versal agreement that - if all credits to private customers were marked to market
valuations - total losses in the US financial sector would be several times the 50
billion US-Dollars or so in write-downs that have already been announced by big
financial institutions. These figures take no account of the likelihood that losses
will spread to the credit card, auto and commercial property sectors.
(...)
On the information available, the “super conduit” has worrying similarities with
Japanese banking practices of the 1990s that aroused criticism from American au-
thorities for their bad credits and the inhibiting effect on new lending. (...) The
government needs to assure that there is a continuing flow of reasonably priced
loans to credit worthy home purchasers. At the same time there need to be tem-
plates established for the restructuring of mortgages to homeowners who cannot
afford their resets, so every case does not have to be managed individually.
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